He tells us, for instance (pp.111-12), that children are born with knowledge of a super rule that if their native language puts the verb before the object,it will use prepositions, but if it puts objects before verbs, it will use postpositions. He doesnot reveal that there is a fair-sized minority of languages that do not follow this'rule'.
Another claim Pinker attaches great importance to is that children know 'innately' thatwe never use regular plurals in compounds such as "rat-eater"; children never say "rats-eater" (pp.146-47). Italian parents' genes must be unaware of this, since their children grow up saying"fruttivendolo", i.e. "fruits-seller", not "fruit-seller".
But perhaps the author's moststartling assertion (p.43) is that natural languages do not form questions by flipping the firstand last words of a sentence or uttering it in mirror-reversed order. Most European languages, fora start, do precisely this, as in German "Sie Rauchen / Rauchen Sie?" - "You smoke / Do yousmoke?"
Readers can find a development of these and other criticisms of the basic flaws inPinker's account of language in my book LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (1999, Intellect). They will also find there a demonstration of the impossibility of Pinker's mentalese, which he believes to be thelanguage of thought.
In playing a game of tagas a child, didn't you ever ask, "Who's it?"